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Abstract: Spoofing attacks on biometric systems are one of the major 
impediments to their use for secure unattended applications.This paper presents a 
novel method for face liveness detection by tracking the gaze of the user with an 
ordinary webcam. In the proposed system, an object appears randomly on the 
display screen which the user is required to look at while their gaze is measured. 
The visual stimulus appears in such a way that it repeatedly directs the gaze of the 
user to specific points on the screen. Features extracted from images captured at 
these sets of colocated points are used to estimate the liveness of the user. A 
scenario is investigated where genuine users track the challenge with head/eye 
movements whereas the impostors hold a photograph of the target user and 
attempt to follow the stimulus during simulated spoofing attacks. The results from 
the experiments indicate the effectiveness of the gaze colocation feature in 
detecting spoofing attack. 
1 Introduction 
Despite the successes in biometric recognition systems in recent decades, they still 
remain vulnerable to  increasingly sophisticated spoofing attacks with the use of fake 
artifacts. These artifacts may be created from the biometric information of genuine users 
and presented at the system sensor(s). An impostor can present a fake biometric sample 
of a genuine user to a biometric recognition system to gain access to unauthorised data 
or premises. This type of spoofing is a direct attack on the sensor (also known as 
presentation attack); the impostor does not require any a priori knowledge about the 
internal operation of the biometric system. To prevent such sensor-level attacks, 
biometric systems need to establish the liveness of the source of an acquired sample. 
Amongst biometric modalities, face recognition has emerged as being socially 
acceptable, accurate and convenient and is therefore used for a variety of security 
applications. But face recognition systems may be considered to be more vulnerable to 
abuse compared to other biometric modalities, because a simple photograph or video of a 
genuine user can be used to deceive such systems [Tr11]. Therefore, by introducing a 
liveness detection mechanism, the security of biometric systems can be substantially 
improved.  
Photographs, masks, and videos are the spoofing artifacts that may be used for attacks at 
sensor level. Photo spoofing can be prevented by detecting motion, smile, eye blinks, 
etc. However, such techniques can be deceived by presenting a video of the genuine user 
to the face recognition system. The subtle differences between a photograph (or video) 
of an individual and the live person needs to be used to establish liveness of the 
presentation at the sensor.  
An important source of liveness information is the direct user interactions with the 
system that are captured and assessed in real time. In this paper we present a novel 
challenge/response mechanism for face-recognition systems, using a standard webcam, 
by tracking the gaze of the user moving in response to a visual stimulus. The stimulus is 
designed to facilitate the acquisition of distinguishing features based on the colocation of 
sets of points along the gaze trajectory. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief overview of the state of the art is 
presented. Section 3 describes the proposed techniques while Section 4 reports on its 
experimental evaluation. Finally Section 5 provides  conclusions and offers suggestions 
for further work. 
2 Related Work 
Various approaches have been presented in the literature to establish liveness and to 
detect presentation attacks. Liveness detection approaches can be grouped into two broad 
categories: active and passive. Active approaches require user engagement to enable the 
facial recognition system to establish the liveness of the  source through the sample 
captured at the sensor. Passive approaches do not require user co-operation or even user 
awareness but exploit involuntary physical movements, such as spontaneous eye blinks, 
and 3D properties of the image. 
Passive anti-spooing techniques are usually based on the detection of signs of life, e.g. 
eye blink, facial expression, etc. For example Pan et al [PWL07] proposed a liveness 
detection method by extracting the temporal information from the process of the eye 
blink. They used Conditional Random Fields to model and detect eye-blinks over a 
sequence of images. Jee et al’s method [JJY06] uses a single ordinary camera and 
analyses the sequence of the images captured. They locate the centre of both eyes in the 
facial image. If the variance of each eye region is larger than a preset threshold, the 
image is considered as a live facial image; otherwise the image is classified as a 
photograph. Wang et al [WDF09] presented a liveness detection method in which 
physiological  motion is detected by estimating the eye blink with an eye contour 
extraction algorithm. They use active shape models with a random forest classifier 
trained to recognize the local appearance around each landmark. They also showed that 
if any motion in the face region is detected the sample is considered to be captured from 
an impostor. Kollreider et al  [Ko09, Ko08, Ko05] combined facial components (nose, 
ears, etc.) detection and optical flow estimation to determine a liveness score. They 
assumed that a 3D face produces a special 2D motion. This motion is higher at central 
face parts (e.g. nose) compared to the outer face regions (e.g. ears). Parts nearer to the 
camera move differently to parts which are further away in a live face. A translated 
photograph, by contrast, generates constant motion at various face regions. They also 
proposed a method which uses lip-motion (without audio information) to assess 
liveness [Ko05]. 
Some anti-spoofing techiques are based on the analysis of skin reflectance, texture, noise 
signature etc. Li et al [Li04] explored a technique based on the analysis of 2-D Fourier 
spectra of the face image. Their work is based on two principles. They proposed the 
principle that as the size of a photograph is smaller than the real image and the 
photograph is flat, it therefore has fewer high frequency components than real face 
images. Kim et al [Ki12] proposed a method for detecting a single fake image  based on 
frequency and texture analyses. They exploited frequency and texture information using 
power spectrum. They also used Local Binary Pattern (LBP) features for analyzing the 
textures. They fused information of the decision values from the frequency-based 
classifier and the texture-based classifier for detecting the fake faces. Pinto et al [Pi12] 
used the noise signatures generated by the recaptured video to discriminate between live 
and fake attempts. They suggested noise was the artifact generated from video captured 
from other video (and not from real scenes). They used the Fourier spectrum, 
computation of the visual rhythm and extraction of the grey level co-occurrence matrices 
as feature descriptors. 
Systems based on the challenge-response approach belong to the active category, where 
the user is asked to perform specific activities to ascertain liveness such as uttering digits 
or changing his or her head pose. For instance Frischholz et al [FW03] investigated a 
challenge-response approach to enhance the security of the face recognition system. The 
users were required to look in certain directions, which were chosen by the system 
randomly. The system estimated the head pose and compared the real time movement 
(response) to the instructions asked by the system (challenge) to verify the user 
authenticity. Ali et al [ADH12] presented a method of liveness detection based on gaze 
tracking. Users are required to follow a moving object with their head/gaze while a 
camera captures images of the user’s face. The path of the object is designed in such a 
way that a number of collinear points are visited. Work has also been reported on using 
the gaze trajectory as a source of biometric information [DG11]. 
The work presented here explores a new feature set, hereby referred to as the gaze 
colocation feature set, for the detection of presentation attacks. Although a similar setup 
to the one in [ADH12] has been used the novel features proposed here establish the 
ability of the natural gaze to return to the same location consistently. Here the users gaze 
is directed to some pre-selected random positions on the display and features are 
extracted from sets of gazes at these colocated targets.The underlying hypothsis is that 
the variance in gazes for colocated positions should be small in genuine user attempts. 
This phenomenon is then exploited to differentiate between a photo spoof attack and a 
genuine user input. Video spoofing presents an even greater challenge. A video camera 
is required and, as reported, sophisticated methods such as video background control, 3D 
masks, 3D facial images and placing fidcucial points in the background are all being 
employed to prevent video spoofing [Tr11, Pa11].  In this paper, however, we do not 
report results of tests on the proposed system under video spoofing attacks. 
3 Liveness Detection through Gaze Tracking 
The scenario considered in this paper is that of a face verification system using an 
ordinary camera (webcam). A block diagram of the proposed system is shown in 
Figure 1. An object appears on the display and the camera (sensor) captures the frames 
as the position of the object on the display changes. The gaze colocation features are 
extracted from the pupil centres in the captured frames which are then classified as 
genuine or fake. 
 
Figure 1: System block diagram 
3.1 Visual Stimulus 
A small object appears at random locations on the screen and the user is required to find 
and follow it with head/gaze movement. It is not necessary to space these targets 
uniformly but ideally these should not be too close to one another and each should be 
visited multiple times. At each appearance of the stimulus, the camera captures an image 
of the user’s face. The presentation of the challenge takes approximately 130 seconds to 
complete, capturing 90 still images at each location of the challenge. The object appears 
in a random sequence to prevent predictive video attacks. The object visits each position 
at least three times. In this way a number of colocated sets of gaze can be identified. In 
Figure 2(a) a genuine user is seen tracking the challenge to establish liveness, while in 
Figure 2(b) the impostor is responding to the challenge by carefully shifting a high 
quality printed photo to gain access to the system. 
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3.2 Facial Landmark Detection 
The images captured during the challenge-response were analysed using 
STASM [MN08] to extract facial landmark points. STASM returns 68 different 
landmarks on the face region using an active shape model technique. The coordinates of 
the center of the pupils were used for feature extraction in the proposed scheme. 
3.3 Gaze Colocation Features 
The gaze colocation features are extracted from images when the stimulus is at a given 
location. The ‘x’ and ‘y’coordinates of the object on the display are same when they 
reappear at a given place at different times during this exercise. It can therefore be 
assumed that the ‘x’ and ‘y’ coordinates of the pupil centres in the corresponding frames 
should also be very close. This should result in a very small variance in the observed x- 
and y-coordinates of the pupil centres in genuine attempts. A feature vector is thus 
formed from the variances of pupil centre coordinates for all the occasions where the 
stimulus is colocated.  
Similar features can be extracted from other facial landmarks, but were not used in the 
results reported here. 
4 Experiments 
The system setup was similar to the one shown in Figure 3. The setup consists of a 
webcam, a PC and a display monitor. The camera used is a Logitech Quick Cam Pro 
5000, and is centrally mounted on the top of a 21.5" LCD screen, a commonly used 
monitor type, having a resolution of 1920×1080 pixels and 5ms response time.  The 
distance between the camera and the user was approximately 750 mm. This distance was 
not a tight constraint but had to be such that the facial features could be clearly acquired 
by the camera. 
 





Data was collected from 8 subjects in 3 sessions. Each subject provided data for both 
genuine and impostor attempts, creating 26 sets of each. During spoofing attacks a high 
quality colour photo of a genuine user was held in front of the camera while attempting 
to follow the stimulus. Each attempt acquired 90 image frames of resolution 352×288 
pixels. This resolution provided a good enough picture quality to recognize the facial 
landmarks. In total, 30 sets of x-y coordinates of the pupil centres from collocated gaze  
targets were extracted resulting in a feature vector of size 60 for each eye. There were a 
small number frames where the pupil centres were not detected by STASM and such 
frames (and associated colocation points) were excluded from the feature extraction 
process. 
For this data, the (x,y) coordinates of the pupil centres from frames captured while users 
are looking at the central stiumulus location are plotted in Figure 4 displaying deviations 
from their mean for all the genuine and fake attempts respectively. It can be observed 
that the range of the points in genuine attempts is much smaller compared to that of the 
spoof attempts. This is because the impostor, relying on hand-eye coordination, is unable 
to align the photo back to the same spot as accurately as a genuine user.  
 
4.1 Evaluation Framework  
Face liveness detection is a two-class problem and there are four possible outcomes of 
the classification process: true positive, true negative, false negative and false positive. 
When a genuine (live/non-spoof) attempt is classified as genuine and a false (fake/spoof) 
attempt is classified as genuine, these are termed true positive (TP) and false 
positive (FP) classifications respectively. Similarly, when a genuine attempt is classified 
as a fake and fake attempt is classified as fake these are called true negative (FN) and 
false negative (TN) respectively. FP and FN are the errorenous outcomes of the process 
and the rates of their occurance is reported as False Positive Rate (FPR) and False 
Negative Rate (FNR) in this report in order to facilitate the assessment and comparison 
of system performance. The term True Positive Rate (TPR) is also used and is equal to 
1-FNR. Total Error Rate (TER)  can be defined as the proportion of misclassified 
attempts out ot all the attempts, including both genuine and fake.  
Figure 4: Pupil centre deviations capture during (a) genuine attempt and 
(b) spoof attempt for the central location of the target 
(a) (b) 
For the experiments reported here, the database was divided into two disjoint sets for 
training and testing purposes. Of the 52 samples, 12 were chosen for testing and the 
remaining 40 for training the classifier.  For training the classifier, 20 random samples 
from fake and 20 from genuine attempts were chosen. The experiments were repeated 50 
times, and on each occasion the system used randomly selected samples for testing and 
training. The mean error rates are reported here. 
4.2 Experimental Results  
Error rates were calculated for a range of system parameters and are reported in this 
section. True Positive Rates at a set of predefined FPR values were obtained and used for 
comparison. The ROC curve of the proposed scheme using features from the single eye 
is presented in Figure 7. It is apparent that the system did not perform very accurately 
when the entire feature vectors are used. However, the performance improved 
significantly when subsets of the available features were used for training and testing. 
The forward feature selection method was used to rank the features [BL97]. the best 
results were achieved when a subset of the best 15 features was used (as shown in 
Figure 7). At 10% FPR, the TPR was above 90% which was only around 40% when 
using the entire feature set.  
 
4.3 Feature Combination Schemes 
While the colocation features from each eye may be used in isolation it is interesting to 
explore if there is complementarity in these feature sets and if a greater accuracy can be 
achieved by their combination. Therefore, both feature and score fusion schemes were 
explored to find if there can be gain in  accuracy by combing information from features 
extracts from the two eyes. The following sub-sections will cover each of these fusion 
schemes in turn. 
Figure 7: Performance with features extracted from a single eye 
4.3.1 Feature Fusion 
The features extracted from both the eyes were concatenated to form a larger feature 
vector which was then used for training and testing.  All 60 features from the left eye and 
the 60 features from the right eye were combined in a feature-level fusion scheme. The 
scheme is illustrated in Figure 8. A feature selection method was incorporated to find the 
optimum feature subsets for this scheme. 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the ROC curves for different feature dimensions. The TPR of the system 
was found to be lower than the instances when only one eye was used. Reducing the 
number of features improved the performance but the best TPR (at 10% FPR) of the 
system was about 80% while for the single-eye system it was above 90%.  
 
4.3.2 Score fusion 
An alternative to the feature fusion strategy, a score fusion scheme is often implemented. 
In the score fusion scheme, these features were extracted from the right and left eyes and 
independent classifiers were used to obtain classification scores for each eye. In this 
multi-classifier system two k-NN classifiers were used for each eye. The a posteriori 
probabilities from the two classifiers were combined using the ‘product rule’ for liveness 
Figure 9: Feature fusion performance 












detection [Ki98]. Figure 10 illustrates the scheme and Figure 11 shows the 
corresponding ROC curves. The scheme achieved a TPR of 99% at FPR of 10%.  
 
 
In order to establish the tradeoff between the feature dimensionality and liveness 
detection accuracy experiments were performed to establish the performance of the 
system as the number of dimensions was steadily reduced. Figure 12 illustrates total 
error rates for different feature dimensions selected using the forward feature selection 
method. It can be seen that the lowest total error rate was observed when the feature 
dimension was reduced to around 15. The total error rate started increasing when the 
feature set was further reduced. The system produced higher total error rates when the 
feature dimension was large. The reason for this might be that only a small amount of 
data was available for training given the size of the feature set. 
Figure 11: Score fusion performance 
















Table 1 presents a comparative performance of the proposed methods at various levels of 
FPR. The feature fusion scheme gave the highest error rates in all cases. While using 
features from only one eye, the system TPR was up to 91%. This improved vastly when 
the score fusion approach was implemented. At 1% FPR, a TPR of 93% was achieved 
using score fusion. At 10% FPR, this rose to 99%. 
 
Table 2 shows a comparative analysis of our experimental observations with the 
performances reported for similar spoof attacks published in the literature. Although the 
results are from different databases they suggest possible comparative ranking of these 
various methods and indicate that the proposed method compares favourably with these 
schemes. 
 












84% 86% 90% 91% 
Feature Fusion 
47% 62% 74% 78% 
Score Fusion 
93% 94% 97% 99% 
 
Figure 12: Variation in accuracy with feature dimension 
 5 Conclusion 
This paper presents a novel feature set for liveness detection in the presence of photo 
spoofing for face verification systems. A challenge-response approach is described 
which uses a visual stimulus to direct the gaze. The test scenario did not constrain the 
users to move either their head or eyes exclusively. However, the proposed gaze 
colocation features provided a robust measure for discriminating between live and fake 
attempts.  
Initial experiments prove the potential viability of this approach, however, more data is 
required to establish the performance of the proposed approach with confidence. 
Although video attacks are excluded in the tests it is expected that within the proposed 
challenge response framework they would be difficult to mount due to the need for 
synchronisation with the challenge sequence. Future work will expand the experiments 
to include a larger database of users and will also explore incorporation of additional 
features for improving the anti-spoofing capabilities of the system in response to more 
sophisticated attacks. In particular the relative position of eye centres within the face will 
be a subject of further study.   
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